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Poland is currently experiencing a constitutional crisis, as the ruling Law and Justice party has
come under international pressure over its actions in relation to the country’s constitutional tribunal.
There is little indication that the government will back down, but, as Aleks Szczerbiak points out,
the crisis is forcing it to expend valuable time and political capital defending its position on the
international stage.
As a political grouping committed to carving out a more independent and assertive foreign policy
and re-calibrating the country’s relationship with the major EU powers, especially Germany,
Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party was expecting to clash with the EU political establishment following
its decisive victory in last October’s parliamentary election. However, it did not foresee that the cause of such a
sharp conﬂict with the EU’s institutions would be a bitter domestic dispute over the membership and functioning of
the country’s constitutional tribunal, a powerful body that rules on the constitutionality of laws.
The crisis began last November almost immediately after Law and Justice took oﬃce when the new government
decided to annul the appointment of ﬁve judges elected by the previous parliament to the 15-member tribunal, to
replace those whose terms of oﬃce were due to expire that month and in December. However, the tribunal itself
ruled that while the appointment of the two judges replacing those whose terms expired in December was
unconstitutional, the other three were nominated legally.
The government argued that the tribunal did not have the right to make judgments about the constitutionality of
parliamentary appointments, and Law and Justice-backed President Andrzej Duda swore in ﬁve judges nominated
by the new parliament instead. Tribunal president Andrzej Rzepliński responded by declaring that the ﬁve would not
participate in its work, although he subsequently allowed two of them to assume their duties.
Law and Justice tried to break this impasse in
December by amending the constitutional tribunal law
to increase the number of judges required to make
rulings in the most important cases from nine to
thirteen, thereby hoping to oblige Mr Rzepliński to
accept the ﬁve judges appointed by the new
parliament. The so-called ‘repair law’ also increased
the threshold for tribunal rulings to a two-thirds
majority and stipulated that cases would be
considered in the order they were received rather
than at the tribunal’s discretion.
However, in March, ignoring the December
amendments and ruling on the basis of the old
procedural rules, the tribunal declared the ‘repair law’
unconstitutional. The government, in turn, said that
the tribunal had no constitutional power to review the
law, which had come into eﬀect as soon as it was
passed, and refused to publish the judgment in the oﬃcial journal, a necessary step for tribunal rulings to become
legally binding.
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Most of the opposition and legal establishment claim that Law and Justice’s actions violate judicial independence
and would paralyse the tribunal, making it more diﬃcult to challenge the government’s legislation. They have
bundled up the dispute over the tribunal’s membership and competencies with a number of other government
measures – notably new laws which they claim politicise the civil service and public broadcasting – to accuse Law
and Justice of undermining the fundamentals of Polish democracy and the rule of law. As a consequence, thousands
of Poles have participated in demonstrations organised by the Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD), a
new anti-government civic movement.
The government’s supporters, however, argue that the previous administration, led by the centrist Civic Platform
(PO) party, tried to appoint ﬁve judges illegally just before the October election to pack the tribunal with Law and
Justice opponents. They point out that had these appointments not been challenged, all but one of the tribunal’s
ﬁfteen members would have been elected by Civic Platform-dominated parliaments, and argue that the ‘repair law’
increases the legitimacy of tribunal judgments and prevents the timing of cases being manipulated. More broadly,
they claim that opposition to the government is being orchestrated by well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt,
post-communist elites and vested interests hostile to its plans to restore pluralism and balance to state institutions.
International pressure intensiﬁes
In April, international pressure on the Law and Justice government intensiﬁed when the European Parliament (EP)
passed a resolution by 513 votes to 142 (with 30 abstentions) saying that the ‘eﬀective paralysis’ of the tribunal
posed a threat to democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Poland. The EP called upon the government to
publish the tribunal’s March ruling and fully implement the recommendations of the Venice Commission, an advisory
body on constitutional matters to the Council of Europe human rights watchdog. The Law and Justice government
actually invited the Commission to Poland earlier this year hoping that it could help end the controversy, but it raised
similar concerns to those expressed by the EP and also supported the appointment of the three judges elected by
the previous parliament.
The EP vote was prompted by a decision by Civic Platform – now the main opposition grouping and a member of
the European People’s Party, the EP’s largest political grouping which prepared the resolution – to attack the ruling
party more openly in European forums. The government’s opponents enjoy close links with the EU political
establishment and western opinion-forming media, many of whom share their dislike of Law and Justice.
The vote came in the wake of the European Commission’s January decision to initiate a preliminary investigation
under an EU monitoring mechanism to establish whether the rule of law in Poland was under ‘systemic threat’. So
far the Commission has taken the ﬁrst step which involves discussions with the member state concerned, but the EP
resolution said that it should move to the next stage and issue a ‘rule of law recommendation’ giving Poland a
speciﬁc time period to address the problems that it has identiﬁed.
Some commentators have also argued that the constitutional crisis is having a negative impact on Polish-US
relations, suggesting that could lead to the July NATO summit in Warsaw being downgraded or ending in humiliation
for Poland. Law and Justice has made the summit a crucial test of its eﬀectiveness in ensuring national security, and
is hoping that it will agree to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern ﬂank to deter Russian aggression, ideally stationing
permanent NATO forces on Polish territory.
A number of articles extremely critical of Law and Justice have appeared in the US opinion-forming media and
American oﬃcials have expressed concerns about how the constitutional crisis is developing. Law and Justice
supporters argue that many US commentators and oﬃcials are either ideologically un-sympathetic to the party or
have been misinformed by well-placed individuals in American foreign policy-making circles who are hostile to the
government.
The government’s opponents, for example, made much of the fact that, during his March visit to Washington for a
three-day nuclear summit, Mr Duda did not have any formal discussions with US administration oﬃcials. Law and
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Justice supporters responded that only three of the 60 world leaders attending the summit secured bi-lateral
meetings with US President Barack Obama, and that Mr Duda held ‘brief but substantive’ informal discussions with
him on the side-lines.
Law and Justice stands its ground
At the moment, Law and Justice is clearly willing to pay a high political price for actions which it says are both
constitutional – arguing that swearing in the three judges elected by the previous parliament and publishing the
tribunal’s March verdict would be illegal – and necessary to ensure that its legislative programme is not de-railed.
The government’s supporters say that the constitutional crisis is a political rather than legal dispute and, therefore, a
matter to be resolved internally. With the stakes so high, agreeing to the tribunal’s demands would also represent a
huge political climb-down and the government currently shows no sign of bowing to what it considers to be
opposition-initiated European and international pressure.
At the same time, the ruling party is also signalling that it is trying to engage in dialogue with the opposition and ﬁnd
a compromise. For example, the Law and Justice-dominated Sejm, the more powerful lower house of the Polish
parliament, has convened a group of legal experts to consider the Venice Commission report and work on
recommendations to resolve the crisis, if necessary by changing the law; although most opposition parties argue
that the government is simply playing for time to appease the international community.
Moreover, the EP resolution has no legal consequences and the Commission, which is currently awaiting a report on
Poland from its Vice-President Frans Timmermans, cannot impose sanctions such as suspending a country’s voting
rights. The ‘rule of law’ framework constitutes a political dialogue and sanctions can only arise if the Commission
invokes Article 7 of the EU treaties and recommends them to the European Council. Here sanctions require
unanimity in one of the three stages of voting, and at least one country, Hungary, has made it clear that it will veto
any attempt to introduce them against Poland.
The Commission also needs to be wary about escalating the dispute. For sure, opinion surveys suggest that most
Poles agree with the constitutional tribunal rather than Law and Justice. A March-April poll conducted by the CBOS
agency, for example, found that 45% of respondents supported the tribunal while only 29% agreed with the
government (29% were undecided). However, while Poles support their country’s EU membership overwhelmingly,
they are much more divided about the idea of European institutions becoming involved in Polish domestic political
disputes.
The same CBOS survey found respondents evenly split on whether EU politicians and institutions were motived by
genuine concern for the state of democracy in Poland (47%) or instinctively hostile to Law and Justice and biased
towards the opposition (45%). Moreover, while Law and Justice has a signiﬁcant number of vocal and well-organised
opponents, it also retains widespread support among a large segment of the electorate, and other polls show that
the ruling party has a clear lead over the divided opposition.
Law and Justice is more sensitive to inﬂuence from the US, which it considers Poland’s most important foreign
policy ally. However, Polish-US relations are strongly rooted and the ruling party is hoping that Washington will be
pragmatic and de-couple whatever concerns it has about the constitutional crisis from security issues. In fact, the
Warsaw summit appears likely to conﬁrm an ongoing process of strengthening NATO’s eastern ﬂank, while there is
a lack of political will for permanent US military bases in Poland anyway, regardless of the constitutional crisis. It also
seems very unlikely that Washington will escalate its concerns about the Polish political situation into a public
conﬂict by, for example, using the summit as an occasion to show its disapproval of the Law and Justice
government.
Will playing for time work?
In spite of the involvement of international actors, Poland’s constitutional crisis is no nearer to being resolved and, if
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anything, becoming more intractable. As the tribunal starts to issue rulings in other cases on the basis of the old
procedural rules, while the government continues to refuse to recognise these judgments by not publishing them,
this could lead to legal paralysis with courts forced to decide whether or not to apply the challenged legislation.
Moreover, the longer the crisis continues the harder it will be for the ruling party to back down without losing face and
it is certainly unlikely to take any action that appears to be giving in to opposition-initiated international pressure. Law
and Justice is hoping that sooner or later the international community will grow tired of Poland’s complicated
political-legal dispute and move on to other issues. However, in the meantime it is being forced to devote valuable
time and political capital to defending its position in the European and international arena.
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